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The characterization by Roger Friedland of institutional logics as a combination of substance 
and practices opens the door to a more complex reading of their influence on organizational 
life. His focus suggests attention to feelings and belief as much as cognition and choice. This 
article uses history to develop these ideas by paying attention to the perennial features of our 
embodied relations with the world and other persons. Historical work draws our attention to 
neglected domains of social life, such as play, which can have profound impacts on 
organizations. The study of history suggests that such institutions have a long run 
conditioning influence that calls into question accounts that stress individual agential choice 
and action in bringing about change.  Analytical narratives of the emergence of practices can 
provide the means to combine the conceptual apparatus of organization theory with the 
attention to temporality of history.   
 
 
The concept of institutional logics has achieved considerable traction in the study of 
organizations. Patricia Thornton, William Occasio and Michael Lounsbury (2012) provide us 
with a comprehensive summary of the work so far done. For them, logics are the “socially 
constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including 
assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to 
their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences.” 
(Thornton, Occasio & Lounsbury, 2012:2). They stress a focus on logics at the societal level, 
suggesting that a limited number of such logics – they list family, community, religion, state, 
market, profession, and corporation – provide resources on which actors draw to develop 
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practices and shape identities. In this process they point to the historically situated nature of 
such logics, giving some brief examples of, for example, the impact of religion on economic 
development through the influence of the Primitive Baptist sect on the formation of J. C. 
Penney in the nineteenth century.  
This use of history, is, however, rather limited. The institutional orders in which 
logics operate are derived inductively from the organizational literature. By contrast, as this 
article will examine in more detail, historians working on a longer time frame might suggest 
other candidates for the status of institution which can enrich our study of organizational life. 
This opens the door to an approach to logics informed by anthropological considerations, in 
which the focus is as much on beliefs and feelings as cognitions and choice. As Roy Suddaby 
has argued, historians  
see institutions as more substantial social structures than organization theorists in 
terms of both time and space. Institutions exist and exert social inﬂuence over 
decades, if not centuries, affecting multiple generations. Similarly, institutions extend 
their inﬂuence more broadly than mere organizational networks, but extend deeply 
into the core fabric of society (Suddaby, 2016: 52).  
Taking such a perspective suggests two related problems with much work in institutional 
theory, explored in more detail below: an excessive focus on agential choice and an 
exaggerated view of the pace of change and the ability of agents to influence this.  
This article marries a focus on how historians have approached the nature of 
institutions with the formulations of Roger Friedland. His suggestion that logics are a 
combination of substance and practice brings questions of value and belief firmly into the 
centre of our discussions. Using this combination, a number of areas of social life, each 
possessing distinctive logics, are discussed through the examination of historical work. I 
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begin by exploring the derivation of institutional logics from the work of Friedland and 
Alford (1991), tracing the divergent paths taken by Thornton, Occasio and Lousbury, and 
Friedland. Drawing on both Max Weber and the Dutch art historian Jacob Huizinga, I present 
a number of spheres of activity that historians have suggested provide sources of value and 
meaning. These are derived from the embodied relationships that humans have with each 
other and with the natural world. Within the framework so derived, historical work is 
reviewed with a view to drawing out some implications for how institutional logics are 
conceptualized.  
In the discussion section I consider some implications of these conceptualizations for 
organizational institutionalism. Formulating institutional logics at a high level of abstraction 
facilitates comparative analysis across time and place, reducing the tendency to universalize 
logics found in particular historical conjunctures. Historical work then suggests how these 
abstract logics play out in concrete situations, where different practices and organizational 
forms mediate the dominance of particular logics. It also suggests caution in the use of the 
term “institutional change”, drawing our attention to multiple temporalities. Play as 
institutional logic in particular is used to suggest some new directions for consideration. 
Finally, the conclusion casts some doubt on the value of ‘toolbox’ metaphors, such as the 
influential work of Ann Swidler (1986), in which cultural ideas are conceptualized as 
resources which can be taken up at will and combined. Rather, it is suggested that the toolbox 
approach underplays the often unconscious and unintentional introduction of logics thanks to 
the selection of practices.  A toolbox metaphor also downplays the extent to which ideas and 
practices are linked in complex relational webs. Practices are not independent objects that can 
be taken up or put down at will. While these connections might not be apparent to actors at 
moments of selection or use, historical analysis can reveal the conditioning logics that shape 
the form and nature of practices. It indicates the restrictions that condition the range of choice 
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available to actors, suggesting the more or less constrained zones of manoeuvre available to 
them. In turn, practices themselves play a key role in reproducing logics. 
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES 
When we consider the use of the term ‘institution’ in the literature generated by new 
institutionalism, we can observe two effects of the different uses of the term. The first is that 
much of new institutionalism is about institutionalization rather than institutions (Jepperson, 
1991; Lawrence, Winn & Jennings, 2001)). In contrast to much of the usage in other 
disciplines, such as sociology and economics, the term institution is used to refer to any 
practice which has become institutionalized (Rowlinson, 1997). Attention is paid to a wide 
range of practices and actions which become taken-for-granted. It is this taken-for-granted 
status which attaches to them the label of ‘institution’ and the focus is on, in particular, 
processes of change. Much of the literature examines how what are termed institutions come 
to be reproduced, challenged or fall from taken-for-granted status. This emphasis tends to 
rather underplay the enduring status of institutions and places considerable stress, as 
discussed below, on the active role of actors in processes of change (Weik, 2015). What this 
focus also tends to elide is the different pace of change at different scales of action (Spicer & 
Sewell, 2010). Local practices, that is, can be much more amenable to change than logics that 
have become sedimented over time , but the language of institutionalization tends to blur 
such differences. 
The second concern is that much of the new institutionalist literature has been 
concerned with questions of agency. This arose in response to concerns that early 
formulations placed too much stress on the conditioning nature of institutions, with not 
enough consideration of how they might facilitate change. One response was to stress the 
social skills of particular actors in being able to instigate change, to be “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997). Another was to emphasize the 
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“institutional work” that was needed to bring about change, a perspective which emphasizes 
how taken-for-granted practices are changed by more or less conscious activity on the part of 
participants (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009).   The problem with this focus on agency is 
that it risks losing some of the power of institutionalist approaches, power which lies in the 
way that institutions provide not only resources for selection but shape the categories of 
agency that are available to actors. Institutions provide role specifications for positions such 
as ‘priest’, ‘general’ or ‘judge’, carrying with them powerful expectations about how roles 
should be conducted. While there might be degrees of freedom within such role 
specifications, they are powerful conditioning influences on action. The very term 
‘entrepreneur’, for example, can be seen to be laden with value drawn from the institution of 
the economy. Failure to acknowledge this runs the danger, as Suddaby (2010) points out, of 
letting the rational actor of contingency theory back in. The combination of a focus on change 
and on the role of agents in enabling such change places too much emphasis on the ability to 
select items from a menu and not enough on the enduring and conditioning nature of the 
contexts in which actors find themselves. 
It is because of these concerns that some scholars in the institutionalist tradition have 
turned to the notion of institutional logics as developed by Friedland and Alford in 1991. For 
Friedland and Alford (1991), institutions are combinations of symbolic constructions and 
material practices that give meaning to the ways in which people engage in their social and 
organizational life. They are few in number, operate at the societal level, and are enduring in 
character. Society, they suggest, consists of a set of institutions, each with their own logics 
and possessing relative autonomy. Institutions display a logic which gives meaning to the 
practices that organizations and individuals engage in, forming the “laws of motion” of a 
particular order. This article develops this perspective by arguing that institutions are each 
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derived from some aspect of the relations between people and their social and natural worlds, 
as demonstrated through the work of historians to be enduring features of human existence. 
A focus on history is supported by the argument that any particular instance of 
organizational action is necessarily emergent from both pre-existing conditions and the 
actions of those who seek to work with or challenge those conditions.  The work of historians 
enables us to specify the nature and development of the pre-existing conditions in which 
actors find themselves involuntarily placed.  The circumstances in which actors find 
themselves condition their actions by providing situational logics which guide, but do not 
determine, their responses (Archer, 1995). For Friedland, the importance of history is that the 
explication of the impact of any particular logic needs to be located in a specific conjuncture 
of time and place. History does more, however, than simply explicate the immediate 
conditions for action. It also points to those features of social life which appear, from the 
evidence, to represent responses to the perennial features that human beings encounter as a 
consequence of their embodied relationships with each other and the natural world. 
The focus here on perennial aspects of the human condition raises for some the spectre of 
essentialism. This is the charge that such relations are seen as fixed and unchanging, playing 
a determining role in human affairs. Such a position has come under fire from arguments that 
reality is socially constructed through language. However, as O’Mahoney (2012) argues, such 
arguments themselves posit, even if tacitly, the existence of a capacity for language. It is 
granted that such capacities manifest themselves in very different ways, but there are 
embodied features that make language a possibility. Further, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have 
shown how features of language, such as metaphors, are themselves draws from embodied 
encounters with both other humans and the natural world. This can then be termed ‘weak’ 
essentialism, in which the recognition of certain embodied capabilities places some 
constraints on human activity, but of a conditioning rather than a determining kind. All social 
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theories contain assumptions about such embodied attributes. For the French philosopher 
Henri Bergson (1960 [1911]: 141) this was founded on two bodily capacities. Because 
bipedalism gave human beings increased mobility, they found themselves in novel situations, 
which demanded new solutions, rather than the instinctive responses of animals confined to 
familiar situations. This gave rise, he argued, to conceptualizations transposable across 
contexts. The capacity for language, meanwhile, gave rise to the ability to share, develop and 
transmit such conceptualizations. From these basic embodied capacities evolved a wide range 
of social structures; history helps us by attesting to those which seem to have been 
fundamental to the ways in which humans make sense of their world.    
At this point it is worth distinguishing between institutional logics and 
institutionalized logics. The concept of a “logic”, a set of interconnected relations that 
condition activity, is a valuable one which can be used for a range of social situations. In the 
study of organizational strategy, for example, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) have used the term 
“dominant logic” to describe the sets of assumptions that govern organizational action, 
providing a sense of direction and appropriateness to organizational actors. The nature of 
such logics is often taken-for-granted, being brought to the fore, in their discussion, in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions. Here the logic of operations that shapes the major player 
is thrown into sharp relief when it comes into contrast with the logic of the target acquisition. 
The failure to merge or adjust the two logics can then lead to under performance. The word 
“dominant” also suggests the possibility of subordinate logics, as well as indicating the power 
relations that might lie at the heart of logics. When such logics within organizations become 
taken-for-granted we may claim that they have become institutionalized, just as we might 
make the same assertions when examining, for example, the field. However, for this 
discussion we need to distinguish such taken-for-granted logics from institutional logics. Just 
in the same way, these logics provide meaning to actions but at the scale of societies. They 
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provide the situational logics for action at the scale of the field or the organization, but are 
relatively enduring in character.  
Friedland and Alford give us a list of institutions - capitalist market, bureaucratic 
state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion – which they quite clearly label as 
features of “the contemporary capitalist West” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 232). They do not, 
however, provide us with any criteria by which they selected these as institutions, preferring 
to elaborate on their notion of the logics which such institutions display. In their influential 
version of this discussion, Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012: 66) suggest an expanded 
list of institutions, ones which we have already seen in the introduction: family, community, 
religion, state, market, profession, and corporation. In developing this list, they quite clearly 
have in mind some criteria for definitions, if these are only presented in negative fashion, by 
drawing attention to what they see as weaknesses in the Friedland and Alford discussion. For 
example, in reviewing the Friedland and Alford (1991) formulation they point out that “The 
influences of the professions, which both Meyer and Rowan … and DiMaggio and Powell … 
so clearly laid out, are mysteriously absent” (Thornton, Occasio & Lounsbury, 2012: 66).  
What, however, makes this ‘mysterious’? There are clearly criteria for such a judgment being 
deployed, but they are not articulated. I return to this question of how we determine the 
institutions that we examine in the body of the article, but the formulation of institutional 
logics has been taken in a different direction by Friedland. 
Friedland is a sociologist of religion who has used his work to suggest that we 
examine institutions as domains for religious action, each animated by belief and love. He 
has, in particular, placed considerable emphasis on the absence of the consideration of love 
and the erotic from our consideration of how institutions work. This focus on the centrality of 
a value-centred view of the internal life of institutions, draws on an Aristotelian notion of 
substance. In Friedland’s terms the substance is the essence of a particular form, something 
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which gives it its distinguishing character. In the context of institutional logics the substance 
is the animating force, the essence that gives meaning to practices. Derived from this he 
suggests that an institutional logic is “a bundle of practices organized around a particular 
substance and its secondary derivatives from which the normativity of those practices is 
derived” (Friedland, 2009: 61). Further, those practices are central to the creation and 
maintenance of substance, which cannot be directly observed but which is “immanent in the 
practices that organize an institutional field, values never exhausted by those practices, 
practices premised on faith” (Friedland, 2009: 61). In turn, Friedland (2014) has related these 
ideas to Max Weber’s notion of ‘value spheres’, giving a useful starting point for the 
identification of institutions and their associated logics. Weber’s essay on “religious 
rejections of the world and their directions”, first published in 1915, took as its starting point 
Indian religious forms, the most developed form, he argued, of religion rejecting the world 
(Weber, 1948). In order to do this, he suggested a number of ideal types of “life orders” or 
“value spheres” against which to contrast the claims of religion. These value spheres 
consisted of different ways of being in the world and Weber considered them in turn to 
explore the tensions between them and religion. These spheres of value were: kinship; 
economic; political; aesthetic; erotic and intellectual. Interestingly, in another essay published 
in the same collection, an extract from Economy and Society, our attention is drawn to the 
importance of the military in providing the template for the wider importance of discipline in 
the modern world. Weber’s value spheres inform the elaboration of Friedland’s discussion 
that is put forward in this article, which develops Friedland’s discussion in two ways.  
One is that he does not propose a corresponding set of value spheres or institutions in 
which logics might operate. His discussion suggests, however, that belief is a central 
criterion. The motivating force for engaging in institutional life is belief in the central 
substance or value (and its secondary derivatives), be it love, accountability, loyalty or 
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honour. If belief is the key sustaining term in linking substance to practices, then we need to 
consider the nature of belief a little further. The theologian Graham Ward (2014) has argued 
that belief is primordial, based on our embodied engagement with each other and the world. 
Drawing on both neuroscience and literature, he argues that belief is anterior to knowledge 
and, indeed, to faith. Although the work of a theologian, this is not a theological argument. 
Rather an inbuilt orientation to believe provides the capacity for religious faith, but also for 
other forms of belief. Institutions, that is, are put in motion and endure because of belief, 
belief which gives meaning to and is manifest in practices. This suggests that belief is one 
criterion by which we can define institutions. It is not just that institutions are taken-for-
granted, but that they involve a commitment to certain value-laden assumptions which 
animate action.  
The second element that we need to add to Friedland is the organization. As a 
sociologist of religion, he is not concerned with the organizational dimension of institutional 
life. As organizational analysts we are interested both in how institutional logics might shape 
organizations across logics and how logics generate distinctive forms of organization. So, for 
example, Protestant sects such as the Primitive Baptists developed organizing models based 
on a commitment to the priesthood of all believers that then formed to-hand templates for 
business organizations. Churches are one distinctive form of organization: we will consider 
others below. While Friedland’s examples often operate with a direct connection between 
specific practices and the animating value, institutional theory would suggest the organization 
as a key mediating factor. We can view organizations as particular bundles of practices, 
practices which are given more stability by being attached to defined positions. Those 
positions carry with them certain performance expectations and can be associated with 
authoritative relations over both people and material resources. Accordingly, the discussion 
below will bring organizations into explicit consideration.  
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For Friedland and Alford (1991: 255) institutions are bound to particular conjunctions 
of time and space, and so history is important. William Ocasio, Michael Mauskapf and 
Christopher Steele (2016: 677) argue that, rather than viewing institutional logics as 
Weberian ideal types, they need to be seen as “historically constituted cultural structures 
generated through collective memory making”. They use the example of the emergence of the 
corporate logic in the United States between 1860 and 1920 drawing on a number of sources 
of memory. In this they provide an example of the use of history to provide content for the 
location of a particular logic. Historians supply us with valuable evidence about how 
institutions have developed and changed over time. However, as Rowlinson, Hassard and 
Decker (2014) have argued, “History” can have a dual sense; it is about both the past and 
about how historians have presented that past. What I am particularly interested in is how 
historians have conceptualized institutions and how such conceptualizations might help the 
analysis of contemporary institutional logics. Before looking at how historians have done 
this, it is helpful to remind ourselves about how Weber used historical materials in his 
discussion of “value spheres” (Townley, 2002: 164). He, of course, was not a historian, at 
least not in the sense of one who delved in the archives to unearth material that shed light on 
events and practices at particular times. He has, however, a good claim to be regarded as an 
originator of historical sociology, one who used the work of historians extensively in 
developing his arguments (Ghosh, 2008). It was only through the use of such materials that 
he could trace the long-term emergence and development of value spheres. 
History is, of course, a broad category. The present discussion draws more on cultural 
and social historians than the business historians who often feature in discussions of history 
in organization theory journals (Rowlinson & Proctor, 1999; Godfrey et al, 2016: 592). As 
Suddaby (2016) argues, this is because cultural and social historians are not only concerned 
with a broader scope of social life but also that they tend to challenge existing theoretical and 
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philosophical approaches. Conventional economic and business historians, suggests Suddaby, 
tend to relegate questions of value and meaning to the sidelines, taking an objectivist view of 
historical “facts” as embodied in time series data. Cultural historians, by contrast, are more 
likely to give us insight into how values have operated and changed over time. The notion of 
a set of value-laden spheres of human activity animated by belief gives us one way of 
approaching the work of the historian Jacob Huizinga, whose work introduces our 
consideration of the resources of history for the definition of institutions. 
THE RESOURCES OF HISTORY 
Huizinga (1872-1945) was a Dutch cultural historian who produced a series of 
important books about European art, in particular in the context of the Middle Ages. Amongst 
these was Homo ludens: A study of the play-element in culture, published in 1944. He argued 
strongly for play as fundamental to human culture. This was a provocative and significant 
contribution, one which is being rediscovered given the attention being paid in some 
disciplines to the significance of games in modern culture. So the analyst of video games 
Miguel Sicart (2014: 2) draws explicitly on Huizinga to argue that “play is a manifestation of 
humanity, used for expressing and being in the world.” On this view, play is not just 
epiphenomenal, but one of the key sources of value in society, value manifest in distinctive 
practices. So Huizinga’s work has continuing relevance. For our purposes, what is intriguing 
is his observation that “while in the more highly organized forms of society religion, science, 
law, war and politics gradually lose touch with play, the function of the poet still remains 
fixed in the play-sphere where it was born” (Huizinga, 1949: 119). There is an echo here, 
although with a slightly different inflection, of Weber’s list of value spheres. The key 
departure, of course, is the inclusion of play. In line with our focus on the perennial features 
of our embodied relationship with the world, the sociologist of professions Eliot Friedson has 
made a persuasive case that medicine, dealing as it does with the human propensity to 
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succumb to disease and the inevitability of death, might also be considered as a primary 
institution.  If we marry these suggestions with the proposition by Friedland that institutional 
logics are composed of a substance and distinctive practices, plus our desire to introduce 
organizations as an explicit component of our discussion, then we get the list outlined in table 
one. Institutions are each derived from some aspect of the relations between people and their 
social and natural worlds, as demonstrated through the work of historians to be enduring 
features of human existence. That such relations play out differently in specific combinations 
of time and place is accepted but, as noted above, these are deliberately at a high level of 
abstraction. This is presented as a guide for our discussion of how historians have approached 
institutions. 
 
Take in table one about here 
The choice of a single word to express the substance of each institution is fraught with 
difficulty. Friedland (2009: 61) refers to “a particular substance and its secondary 
derivatives”; a complete discussion would consider these derivatives. However, for the 
present argument the criterion is something which seems to motivate belief and give meaning 
to distinctive practices. In the final column I give an example of a representative practice 
which is distinctive in that institution. Intervening is a category which is not salient in 
Friedland’s discussion but needs to be for our purpose, that of the organization. Organizations 
are included because our particular interest, often neglected by historians, is how 
organizational forms mediate particular forms of logic.  Again, the examples given are 
representative only.  
One choice here deserves a little further discussion. The family as a form of collective 
relationship bound by ties of kinship rather than instrumentality is the institution in which the 
relationship between the substance and the practices seems at its most immediate, relatively 
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unmediated by other organizational forms, like platoons or congregations, which are proper 
to other institutions. There are plenty of such forces from other institutions seeking to mould 
the family, from law courts to church bodies, each claiming and contesting jurisdiction. But it 
seems difficult to conceive of the family itself as an organization. At particular times in 
history and in particular places, however, one could argue the household is a form of 
organization, especially when it contains unrelated members, such as servants. This is 
clearest in farming and craft environments, where workers and apprentices are housed under 
the same roof and treated as members of an extended family. Again, in each case much more 
could be said about the dimensions of each putative institution, but the discussion that 
follows is of necessity compressed, picking up on some illustrative rather than exhaustive 
aspects. It starts with a discussion of how historians have approached institutions, with a 
particular focus on the nature of embodied relationships with the world that emerge and 
solidify over time. It then shows how historical accounts can help us understand some of the 




When in her history of domestic life in eighteenth-century England, the cultural 
historian Amanda Vickery (2009: 193) refers to “the fundamental institution of society, the 
male-headed household family”, you will search in vain for a definition of the term 
“institution”. It is simply assumed, with the focus being on its elaboration through the 
provision of evidence which shores up the concept. This frustrates some historians. In the 
words of the medievalist Chris Wickham (2011: 221),  
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Historians tend to avoid theorising; it is one of the most characteristic cultural features 
of the discipline, in fact. But it is also one of its major weak points, for the attachment 
of historians to the empiricist-expository mode only-too-often hides their theoretical 
presuppositions, not only from others, but from the writers themselves. 
The suspicion of theory on the part of many historians, or certainly its overt 
explication, means that concepts are often woven into the fabric of the narrative. Indeed, the 
structuring of that narrative is in itself an important part of the conceptual labor that 
historians engage in. As one historian who does deploy concepts drawn from social theory to 
examine changing practices and their impact on identity says, in explaining why his 
conceptual apparatus is woven into his analysis, “[s]ome of the theoretical literature contains 
many historical mistakes, and it is probably best to use it as a jumping-off point, inspiring 
new questions, rather than regard it with too much respect” (Snell, 2006: 23).  However, a 
historian who was not averse to debates in social theory, E. P. Thompson, provides intriguing 
support to the Friedland and Alford (1991) conceptualization of separate institutions, each 
powered by their own internal logics, when in his study of eighteenth century England he 
observes 
The law may also be seen as ideology, or as particular rules and sanctions which stand 
in a definite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social norms; and, 
finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures – that is, 
simply as law. And it is not possible to conceive of any complex society without law 
(Thompson, 1977, 260: my emphasis). 
Historians are also frequently suspicious of comparative work, immersed as they often 
are in the contingencies of particular historical conjunctures. This is especially the case when 
comparative work, as in some economic history informed by econometrics, is associated with 
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a positivist search for invariant laws (Steinmetz, 2014). However, there is another sense in 
which comparison is of value, and that is in making the taken-for-granted strange. As the 
historian of classical antiquity, Paul Veyne, observes, “if in order to study a civilization, we 
limit ourselves to reading what it says itself - that is, to reading sources relating to this one 
civilization - we will make it more difficult to wonder at what, in this civilization, was taken 
for granted” (Veyne, 1984: 7). This has a particular resonance for the view of institutional 
logics developed here, which sees them as tightly bound to particular practices, practices 
which are all the more powerful when they appear natural and obvious. Comparative work, as 
we will see, can challenge the taken-for-granted and help us see in new ways. 
Institutions emergent from embodied relations with the world 
In his analysis of the nature of professional work, Friedson examines its intersection 
with what he terms the ‘core disciplines’ of social life. He sees these as “bodies of knowledge 
and skill which address perennial problems that are of great importance to most of humanity” 
(Friedson, 2001: 161). “[M]edicine, law, and religion exemplify such disciplines,” he argues, 
“dealing as they do with relief from pain, illness, and disability..., the just resolution of 
disputes and maintenance of social order, and a comforting relationship to the perennial 
misfortunes of life and the inevitable prospect of death” (Friedson, 2001: 161).They are 
characterized by attachment to what he terms “transcedent values”, in this case “Health, 
Justice, and Salvation” (Friedson, 2001: 161). He goes on to examine other transcedent 
values such as “Beauty, Truth, or Knowledge” (Friedson, 2001: 167). These transcedent 
values and the associated ‘disciplines’ look very like institutions and their associated 
substances as Friedland discusses them. But how are they to be identified? Friedson’s use of 
the term “perennial” suggests that they are chronically recurring. Further, just as with play in 
Huizinga’s discussion, they are taken as being fundamental to the human condition. History 
is a way of tracing the existence and evolution of these responses to “perennial” aspects of 
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the human condition. We can group them into three categories. There are those institutionns 
which arise from the struggle for embodied existence in the natural world, leading to 
solutions for reproduction, material existence and physical well being: family, economy and 
medicine. There are institutions arising from a desire to make sense of that embodied 
existence: religion, play and knowledge.1  Finally, human existence is a profoundly social 
one, albeit emergent from individual engagement with the natural world, and mechanisms 
have evolved for dealing with social interactions: dispute resolution by physical force, by 
regulation, or by debate: the military, the law and politics. What history demonstrates is not 
only the perennial nature of such responses but the complex and shifting nature of their 
manifestation in practices.  
Practices as carriers of institutional logics 
One institution which possesses distinctive practices and organizational forms, 
together with a belief in values which often set its practitioners off from civilian life, is the 
military.  Indeed, some of those practices, such as intensive drilling, have precisely the 
purpose of engendering such a separation, taking their meaning from a military logic. That 
logic might be expressed in a number of words – courage, reputation, glory, loyalty, are all 
candidates – but honour seems to express best this animating principle. If practices take their 
meaning from the institutional logic in which they are embedded, this does not mean that they 
are necessarily engaged in because of formal belief in and commitment to that logic. While 
practices may have had their origins in a conscious design process, they may over time 
become detached from such origins. This, however, makes them no less powerful in 
expressing the substance at the heart of the logic. This is seen most clearly when practices 
become hardened into rituals. History is invaluable here in helping us to trace this process. 
The tendency to talk as if logics are selected by organizations neglects this long term 
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conditioning, conditioning which can only be indicated by the careful tracing of historical 
emergence.   
As the analyst of religious ritual Harvey Whitehouse (2004: 69) has argued, “what it 
means to be a regular churchgoer is not to be part of a particular group but to participate in a 
ritual scheme and belief structure that anonymous others also share.” In order to participate in 
such rituals, it is not necessary to have formal knowledge of why rituals are as they are, but 
how to perform them. In turn, such performances reproduce the logic in which they are 
embedded, with consequences for identity.  As Whitehouse (2004: 93) observes, “people who 
attend church regularly do not need to have quasi-theoretical knowledge of the links between 
standing and singing, kneeling and praying, and sitting and listening, such knowledge is 
bound to emerge over time.”  That knowledge can then generate particular identities which 
are shaped more by the common performance of the ritual than by abstract theoretical 
considerations. In his study of the religious influences on the cities of Boston and 
Philadelphia, Baltzell (1979: 367) recounts the story of an eminent Boston Unitarian 
commenting to an Episcopalian friend, “Eliza, do you kneel down in church and call yourself 
a miserable sinner? Neither I nor any member of my family will ever do that!” (emphasis in 
original). These practices are at their most powerful when they appear “natural”. Comparative 
historical analysis of particular practices, setting them in the wider context of their emergence 
and development, is one powerful way to make such practices “strange” and so to indicate the 
logics that they manifest. 
Practices change; logics endure 
Friedland’s discussions of logics tends to focus on the relationship between practice 
and substance at a particular point in time. However, history, with its focus on multiple 
temporalities, suggests that, once emergent from particular practices, logics can endure while 
the detail of the practices they influence can change.  An example of this in organizational 
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analysis is provided by the careful tracing of change in legal practice in Anglo-German law 
firms undertaken by Smets, Morris and Greenwood (2012). They show that practices 
reflected assumptions built into the different legal logics provided by, on the one hand, 
English common law and, on the other, German civil law. It was when these practices were 
brought together that tensions ensued, tensions which were eventually resolved by hybrid 
practices. That such practices might over time become adopted as organizational practice is 
where their account leaves us. We can imagine that, once adopted by particular organizations, 
such practices might, in time, change similar practices in the field demarcated by commercial 
law as shaped by the needs of cross-national finance. However, whether such developments 
might change the particular nature of the law in each country, given its basis in very different 
and enduring conceptualizations of the law, is open to considerable doubt.  
The specific difference that Smets, Morris and Greenwood draw our attention to is the 
construction of contracts. Contracts drawn up by German lawyers were sparse in form, 
resting on the specification of standard terms in legal codes. By contrast, English lawyers 
produced dense contracts with many clauses. This difference reflected the assumptions 
embedded in different legal systems, suggesting a more enduring logic. Lauren Edelman, 
Christopher Uggen and Howard Erlanger show how grievance procedures in US companies 
were modelled on perceptions of legal practice. “Grievance procedures appear rational,” they 
argue, “because they look like the system of appeals available in the public legal process” 
(Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger 1999: 416). These same grievance procedures come to be 
accepted over time as evidence of best practice by the courts and so changed the substance of 
the law. On their account this process took place over a period of some thirty years. However, 
what did not change (although they do not discuss this) was the underlying logic of a 
common law system, in which the interpretation of laws by judges depends in turn on cases 
being brought, results being published and precedents drawn on. This is a quite different logic 
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from the emphasis on codification in civil law systems, a logic which could be found in the 
royal academies of seventeenth-century France that Victoria Johnson (2007) examined. Here, 
royal academies, “an organizational form sponsored by the king and traditionally devoted to 
private discussion among academy members”, were seen as the to-hand template for the 
organization of the Paris Opera (Johnson, 2007: 104). In turn, those academies promoted a 
logic of centralized political control, in which the “main goal was codification of guidelines 
for production in an academy's given area of cultural or scientific specialization” (Johnson, 
2007: 108). These examples suggest that we need to exercise caution in talking of 
institutional change. Practices may change readily, organizations more slowly but, history 
suggests, logics endure. That is not to say that they do not change, but these examples of 
contrasting legal systems mean that we need to be careful to contextualize institutions to 
particular conjunctures of time and place. 
Historical narratives cause us to question the account of institutional change 
embedded in actor-centred conceptions such as the institutional entrepreneur. In her 
discussion of the evolution of the Paris Opera since its inception in the seventeenth century, 
Johnson (2007: 119) shows how “the recombination of models that led to the founding form 
of the Opera emerged not through the efforts of a single actor, but instead through the 
interactions of that actor with influential others in his environment.” Such historical accounts 
suggest that it took a number of actors, both individual and collective, over a long number of 
years to effect broader change. When the Liverpool, UK, brewer Andrew Barclay Walker 
employed salaried managers, rather than tenants, in his public houses in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, it is doubtful whether he had any intention of changing practices in the 
broader industry. Rather, he sought practices which made sense in his immediate context, but 
which were to-hand to him from his status as a Scottish migrant into an English context 
(Mutch, 2007). The company he developed, Peter Walker & Son, would indeed later 
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proselytise on the part of the merits of management. However, this met with little support 
until a collective movement of both social reformers and leading figures in the industry 
seized on the practice of direct management as part of their campaign to change the nature of 
drinking. It took over one hundred years and a succession of actors to cement the taken for 
granted status of the practice (Mutch, 2006a).   
This represents change within one institutional logic. Massimiliano Tomba (2012: 
175) has used the metaphor of geological layers to draw attention to the ways in which logics 
can develop at different paces. This is developed as a challenge to linear, sequential models 
in which there is a coordinated change between logics. Rather, he points out, ‘archaic’ 
elements, such as slavery, can combine with advanced economic development. Although the 
metaphors of strata and sedimentation have limits, because they do not account for dynamic 
connections across logics, they do point to different paces of change in logics. Economic 
practices, for example, may change with considerable rapidity, while religious practices are 
more enduring. It is this concern with multiple temporalities that characterizes much 
historiographical debate (Osbourne, 2015). This is not time as a variable, but history as 
irreversible.  We can see the origins of this concern in the influential work of Bergson (1960 
[1911]). He distinguished the linear time of science, characterized by its decomposition into 
interchangeable units, from the qualitative experience of time as duration. From this the 
French historian Marc Bloch developed the scheme that would be associated with the 
influential Annales school of historical analysis, with its focus on the longue duree, that is, 
the slowly unfolding structures of economics and demography that conditioned human 
activity (Osbourne, 2015: 40). This focus on the long term, almost glacial pace of change, 
emphasizes the need to recognize that different social phenomena operate at different 
temporalities.  
Historically specific forms of logics and their relationships 
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We have seen in the above example that the law as a societal institution takes very 
different forms in England and Germany. We could point to other areas of social life where it 
is important to see institutions as differentiated, while still adhering to a central form of logic. 
If, for example, we take religion as in the words of one sociological definition, “any 
mythically sustained concern for ultimate meanings coupled with a ritually reinforced sense 
of social belonging” (Demerath & Schmitt, 1998: 382), then the logic inherent in that 
statement can be instantiated in a variety of forms. To take Western Christianity as a starting 
point, there was a time when, in broad terms, the institutional logic was consistent with an 
undifferentiated institution, in which the Catholic church provided both the authorized belief 
system and the approved practices, as well as the only legitimate organizational form. 
However, the Reformation saw the emergence of competing formulations in all these 
dimensions (MacCulloch, 2004). At least three major competing formations, each with their 
own formal statements of belief, their own distinctive practices and their own organizational 
form, came into existence: the Lutheranism that characterized much of Germany and northern 
Europe; the Calvinism of the Netherlands and Scotland; and the Episcopalianism of England. 
From this time, any consideration of ‘religion’ as an institution within Christianity has to 
consider the particular form that is under consideration.   
This specific form then comes into relationship with the other institutions that 
constitute society. In some cases this forms a complementary relationship. In Scotland, for 
example, one can trace a mutually supportive relationship between religion, law and 
education (Mutch, 2015). Scots law drew heavily on a Roman law tradition, in which there 
was, by European standards, an early attempt to codify legal rules and promulgate these in 
written form. This in turn rested on widespread literacy in an educational system which 
featured the same focus on starting from first principles that characterized both the law and 
the particular religious form of the Church of Scotland. In turn, that church both monitored 
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and encouraged the growth of a basic education system and a higher education system. This 
distinctive complex of institutional forms can be seen in sharper focus when contrasted with 
the position in England, where a common law tradition and a state church featuring both a 
nominal hierarchy and a strong element of devolved authority fostered the enduring influence 
of custom and tradition. This was reinforced by an ad hoc and fragmented educational 
system, whose pinnacles in the form of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge remained 
profoundly shaped by and limited to particular religious traditions. The implications for 
economic activity is that the distinctive complex of logics in Scotland gave rise to a particular 
focus on accounting and accountability. This sheds light on the significant contribution of 
Scots to the development of the accounting profession, indicating the value of setting 
organizational developments in their broader historical context (Previs & Merino, 1997).   
Another historical example of the different receptions of business practice across 
different polities is supplied by Frank Dobbin’s (1994) examination of the response to 
railways in the United States, Britain and France in the nineteenth century. “English political 
traditions,” he argues, “gave sovereignty to elite individuals rather than to autonomous 
communities, as in the United States, or to the central state, as in France” (Dobbin, 1994: 
159). These different traditions in turn gave rise to very different responses to railways as 
expressed in industrial policy. These responses, then, were produced by enduring logics that 
were not necessarily articulated as such by participants in debates but that conditioned the 
resources that were to-hand. Revealing such logics depends on accessing and deploying 
historical work that examines the development over time of, in this case, political logics. If 
we return to the observation about comparative analysis from Paul Veyne (1984), it is only 
when we place these contrasting features next to each other that we appreciate that logics are 




Institutions emerging but shaped by their emergence 
While the focus of history is on the endurance of institutions over long periods of 
time, this is not to say that they do not change. One particularly important observation from 
history is that institutions are carved out of founding institutions, but retain the marks of that 
emergence. The final value sphere that Weber considered was what he termed the 
‘intellectual’ one; we noted above that knowing and philosophy were cardinal reference 
points for Huizinga as well. It is therefore mysterious, to use Thornton et al’s (2012: 66) 
word, why knowledge has not featured in accounts of institutional logics more prominently. 
After all, most of those who write on the topic hail from what are termed, in another 
discourse, ‘institutions’, and confront in their working activities questions of the boundaries 
between their world and those of the ‘real’ world (as in the debate on relevance). In addition, 
for some, such as John Meyer (2008), the spread and development of higher education is a 
key element in the rationalization of the modern world. It is also the domain which illustrates 
most clearly the carving out of significant areas of activity from the purview of religion. 
Indeed, this heritage is what gives added spice to the debates between science and religion. 
Ways of knowing the world, and their associated educational arrangements, start with control 
by a priesthood. As Weber notes 
The priesthood, as the only agents capable of conserving tradition, took over the 
training of youth in the law and often in purely administrative technologies, and, 
above all, in writing and calculus. The more religion became book-religion and 
doctrine, the more literary it became and the more efficacious it was in provoking 
rational lay-thinking, freed of priestly control (Weber, 1948: 351). 
From this emerged the universities, firstly as specialist centres of theological training 
and then as broader centres. In some places, such as England, this religious function 
continued to color the university curriculum for centuries; in others, such as Scotland, areas 
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of more practical application such as medicine and geology appeared much sooner (Carter, 
1990). Clearly, this is an on-going relationship, with the imprint of religious origins still 
being evident in, for example, the persistence of universities with denominational 
attachments. How far such attachments shape the pursuit of knowledge within such 
organizations is a matter for empirical investigation. 
We can apply this to what is often presented as the most ‘objective’ area of human 
activity, the economy. As presented by mainstream economics, this often operates with the 
assumptions of rational choice, uncolored by the influences of culture. However, it is the core 
of the institutionalist project that not only are there cultural forces at work in society that 
overflow the rational calculations said to be indicative of economic activity, but that 
economic activity itself is profoundly shaped by culture. The rationality of economic life, that 
is, is as much an artefact of the search for order by economists, themselves shaped by 
powerful myths, as it is a natural property of economic life itself. At the heart, just as with the 
other institutions, is belief. The philosopher of religion Mark Taylor has argued that in Adam 
Smith’s work, God becomes secularized: “God did not simply disappear but was reborn as 
the market” (Taylor, 2004: 6).  The market then becomes the object of faith, in which 
practices, such as the granting of credit, take their efficacy from a belief in shared 
rationalized myths. This for Taylor then becomes a ‘confidence game’ in which economic 
activity is based not on real world production but on belief in future states. Emil Kauder 
(1965) in his History of Marginal Utility Theory takes this analysis of the impact of religion 
on economic thought still further. Noting the central place of work as a justified activity in its 
own right in Calvinist theology, he suggests that Adam Smith, bathed in the Scottish 
Presbyterian literature, put labor in the centre of his account of value creation. By contrast, he 
argues “moderate pleasure-seeking and happiness form the centre of economic actions” in 
Catholic traditions (Kauder, 1965: 9). This gives a contrasting emphasis on consumption 
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rather than production as the motor of economic activity. Such accounts suggest that the 
impact of the context from which practices emerged can be profound, even at a considerable 
distance in time. 
DISCUSSION 
From history, therefore, we can get a sense of institutions enduring while changing. 
That change can continue to bear the marks of foundational circumstances. It suggests that in 
considering institutional change we need to be alive to multiple temporalities, taking care not 
to conflate change in practice, organization or field with societal change. As we have noted, 
historians offer a significantly different list of institutions from those featuring in 
organizational theory, but do not discuss the criteria for selection. On the basis of their work, 
however, I have argued that institutions are each derived from some aspect of the relations 
between people and their social and natural worlds, as demonstrated through the work of 
historians to be enduring features of human existence. That such relations play out differently 
in specific combinations of time and place is accepted and it is the task of empirical analysis 
to locate these relations in their historical context. In this section I consider the implications 
for our views of change, followed by some consequences for organizational analysis. 
History, logics and change 
One concern with much of the work in new institutionalism is that it appears bound to 
phenomena that are typical of the global north, especially the USA. That debate happens in 
other spheres as well. The validity of the application of a concept like ‘religion’ has been 
brought into question when detached from what are seen to be its origins in the consideration 
of western religions (Asad, 1993). This remains an open debate, but one consequence is the 
need to specify the concept at a level of abstraction which makes it transferable across time 
and place. Thus in the sociology of religion an influential definition of religion, one which 
recognizes this need for portability across contexts, is “any mythically sustained concern for 
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ultimate meanings coupled with a ritually reinforced sense of social belonging” (Demerath & 
Schmitt, 1998: 382). Of course, such a conceptualization is also potentially transferable, as 
Friedland suggests, to other institutions. The idea of the outline in table one is that the 
institutions are potentially applicable across a range of temporally and spatially situated 
activities. Of course, the balance of each will be different and there is nothing in this 
formulation that suggests the primacy of any of them. In eighteenth century England, for 
example, Thompson suggested that it was the law that we need to turn in order to understand 
the nature of society, rather than the military, religion or the economy (Thompson, 1977: 
262). 
  Thus it follows that any analysis has to consider the specificity of each institution in a 
particular time and place. To return to our focus on religion, Weber’s analysis of the 
relationship between religion and the economy covered, as we have seen, the major world 
religions. These had very different inflections, and these inflections changed over time. 
Religious belief generates distinctive forms of organization which mediate the relationship 
between substance and practice. The church is a way of organizing religious practice which is 
particularly associated with Christianity, but even here there are considerable differences in 
form, from the centralized control and hierarchy of Roman Catholicism to the local control of 
Congregationalism (Jeremy, 1998). This reminds us that there can be tensions and 
contradictions within specific instantiations of an overall institution. So not only are there 
different conceptions of what faith is taken to be between religions such as Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam, for example, but each tradition is itself internally divided. This points to 
the need to be specific about how a substance like “faith” is interpreted and mobilized. The 
outline presented, that is, can only be a broad sketch which needs to be populated for specific 
instances. It has been my contention that history is vital to this act of population. 
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What history also points to is the enduring nature of institutions in a way which 
should give us pause in using the phrase “institutional change”. If we conceptualize 
institutions as being enduring in the way that historians envisage them, then such change 
happens but slowly and over long periods of time. This means that we need to be careful in 
seeing fields and organizations as mediators for the impact of institutions. Over time, changes 
in practice can shift logics at the level of the field, as carefully traced in the legal sphere by 
Smets, Morris and Greenwood (2012). In time, such changes may shift the meaning of the 
central institution, but this is likely to be over a much longer timescale and involve collective 
actors.  
Implications for organizational analysis 
If we turn now to the implications for organizational analysis, consideration of values 
and beliefs engendered by our embodied existence in the world suggests a broadening of the 
spheres of activity that shape life in organizations. This provides an opening to richer, more 
complex readings of organizational life, informed by the broader resources of arts and 
humanities. It also suggests that institutional logics are not just experienced cognitively but 
are felt. This supports the idea that beliefs and emotions are as important as cognitions in the 
impact of institutions (Voronov & Weber, 2016). Perhaps the most distinctive suggestion is 
that we consider play as an institution. Huizinga, writing in the 1940s, was sceptical about the 
role of play in modern society. For him, “the sad conclusion forces itself upon us that the 
play-element in culture has been on the wane ever since the 18th century, when it was in full 
flower” (Huizinga, 1948: 2069). He saw developments such as the rise of organized sport as 
false play, because it was taken too seriously. An interesting suggestion made almost as an 
aside was “[b]usiness becomes play. This process goes so far that some of the great business 
concerns deliberately instil the play-spirit into their workers so as to step up production. The 
trend is now reversed: play becomes business” (Huizinga, 1948: 165). But if we take his 
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focus seriously then it draws our attention to the ways in which many areas of economic 
activity play is re-entering the workplace. From hi-tech offices to residential courses, play is 
promoted as a way of both attracting knowledge workers and of changing the nature of work. 
We can be skeptical about the “true” level of fun that is expressed in such pronouncements, 
but it perhaps indicates to us the wider place of play in contemporary society. After all, it 
cannot be said that in the pursuit of fun there are not significant practices and specific 
organizational forms, from art galleries to symphony orchestras, from jazz bands to music 
festivals, several of which have featured in influential new institutionalist accounts 
(DiMaggio, 1982; Townley, 2002).  
It is not just a matter, however, of the direct impact of alternative meaning systems on 
business organizations. In his ethnographic investigation of the nature of the fandom 
associated with the music of Bruce Springsteen, Daniel Cavicchi argues that just  
as religion somehow stands "aside from the rest of life" and represents an alternative 
society based on the kingdom of God, fandom represents for fans a refuge from the 
turmoil of everyday life, an institution that exists above the ordinary and provides a 
steady and continual source of values, identity, and belonging (Cavicchi, 1998:  188).  
In his case, fandom provided a source of meaning in which the efforts of the music 
business were seen as irrelevant. In other examples of logics derived from fun, the Liverpool 
football fans that Adrian Tempany (2016) studied drew on their construction of themselves as 
supporters, derived from a logic of play that emphasized both fun and loyalty to sporting 
tradition, to contest the desire of the owners of the club to cast them as customers. “If we are 
just consumers,” one group argued, “then we don't have an identity” (Tempany, 2016: 228). 
While institutions like the military and medicine deal with particular aspects of human 
existence, operating with distinctive practices animated by commitment to particular values, 
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it is perhaps those like religion and play that supply more general meaning systems, ones 
which can inflect or contest economic arrangements.  
Using history to problematize the candidates for the status of institutions thus offers 
new considerations for the logics which might shape organizational life. Much of the focus of 
existing work has been on how areas of social life have been colonized by economic logics, 
which has tended to neglect the enduring impact of, for example, religious practices on 
economic life (King, 2008). A notable exception is the attention paid by Greenwood, Diaz 
and Li (2010) to the impact of family and religious logics on Spanish manufacturing 
companies. The direction of influence, that is, does not have to be all one way. Starting from 
the array of institutions in any particular conjuncture and specifying their influence on 
organizational life is an alternative to using logics as a to-hand tool to explain empirical 
findings. Accounts of institutional logics that frame them in inductive fashion based on the 
appearance of particular phenomena in the literature run the risk of narrowing the range of 
logics that condition organizational life.  
We have noted that some organizations are specialized to particular institutions, but it 
is more likely that organizations stand at the confluence of number of competing institutions 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008). And certainly, organizational members are likely to have been 
formed in different institutional logics, giving rise to both tensions and to possibilities for 
innovation. The discussion of institutions here, based on the ways in which historians have 
used the concept and have provided evidence for the ways in which institutions change and 
conflict over time, has been presented in order to address some of the concerns about agency 
and change presented at the beginning of the article. In suggesting that institutions are 
responses to enduring relationships between humans and between humans and the natural 
world of which they are a part, history indicates to us the plasticity of arrangements which 
can be generated by these capacities.  
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Comparative historical work enables us to make practices ‘strange’. One valuable 
aspect of institutionalist approaches is the attention that is paid to mundane, everyday 
practices. However, the distinctive nature of such practices is often only apparent when set 
against contrasting examples. For example, the practice of drawing up contracts in common 
law as opposed to civil law jurisdictions produces significantly different artefacts. Within the 
boundaries of the logics that they instantiate, each practice makes sense and appears obvious 
and ‘natural’ to practitioners. It is only when set against each other that differences are 
revealed, differences which can in turn be related to the assumptions embedded in the logics 
of different legal systems. It is thus necessary to go beyond the performance of specific 
practices to set them in the context of the logics that they reproduce. Historical work is 
valuable in demonstrating the relationship between practices and enduring logics as they 
unfold and develop.  
CONCLUSION 
Animating this discussion has been a concern that much analysis in the institutionalist 
tradition has drifted away from the ambition of Friedland and Alford (1991) to ‘bring society 
back in’. While fascinating narratives of changes in practices have been produced, the 
nagging doubt remains that these are at best accounts of the process of institutionalization, 
rather than examinations of institutional change. Where institutions and their associated 
logics have been conceptualized as societal phenomena, they have been seen as composed of 
modular components which can be selected and combined at will, as opposed to a complex 
relationship of elements which cannot easily be teased apart.  The work of cultural and social 
historians provides one way of directing our attention to the long run impacts of institutional 
logics.  Historical work gives us the sense that practices are the bearers of logics, logics 
which might not be readily evident to participants but which are indicated by the adoption of 
a longer timeframe. Adoption of practices thus brings with it entanglements in complex 
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networks of relations which involve other material practices and cultural symbols. In turn, 
viewing logics as the connection between practices and an animating substance helps to focus 
our attention on the ways in which such logics emerge from the perennial problems that 
humans face. The result is a challenge to existing, taken-for-granted accounts of the 
institutions that shape organizational life. Historical work opens the way for a richer and 
more complex account of the logics that condition organizational action. It provides a 
stronger focus on sources of meaning, especially in relatively neglected domains such as 
religion and play. 
Attention to the enduring nature of institutions forms a valuable counterweight to a 
dominant focus in discussions of institutional theory on process and agency. It directs our 
attention to the need to be cautious about the nature of change, recognizing the different 
temporalities at work at differing scales of action. Drawing on both the conceptualization of 
institutional logics supplied by Friedland and the resources of history, I have suggested that 
we view institutions as societal phenomena, animated by core values which are immanent in 
practices. Historical work suggests the importance of belief founded in some enduring 
aspects of the relationships between human beings and their natural and social worlds. These, 
I have suggested, can be grouped under three headings: embodied existence in the world, the 
attempt to make sense of that existence, and means for resolving disputes. Historical work 
indicates how these institutions change over time, but how core aspects of their logics endure. 
It suggests that we need to pay attention to how new institutions are carved out of existing 
ones, bearing the marks of their birth. We also need to consider how logics are manifest in 
particular conjunctures of time and place, with some aspects more prominent at certain times 
than others. 
The framework outlined above should help in facilitating comparative analysis. 
Drawn at a level of abstraction which allows transferability across contexts, institutions are 
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released from assumptions grounded in one particular location in time and space. If, as 
argued above, practices are carriers of logics, then comparative work across contexts can 
reveal the extent to which practices are taken for granted. Comparison enables us to make 
practices strange and, in so doing, to reveal the logics that they instantiate. Comparison, of 
course, does not just have to happen synchronically; contrasting practices at different points 
in time can serve to indicate points of both continuity and change. Having a sense of logics as 
substances immanent in practices, yet not reducible to those practices, can help us identify 
such features. 
Attention to history urges caution about the use of “toolbox” metaphors. These 
suggest that actors have a menu of cultural items which they can select from, which can lead 
to the idea that logics, or elements of them, are selected. Rather, it is practices that are 
selected without necessarily appreciating the ways in which they carry with them associated 
logics. Historical work would suggest that practices can become detached over time from 
their foundational logics, but retain the traces of that logic (Johnson, 2007). The tendency to 
talk as if logics are selected by organizations neglects this long-term conditioning, 
conditioning which can only be indicated by the careful tracing of historical emergence.   
Historical work indicates the importance of operating with multiple temporalities. Change in 
practices may well happen with relative ease, while broader arrangements are much slower to 
change. This is particularly the case with underlying logics. The work of historians forms a 
valuable resource for understanding the enduring nature of many of the logics which shape 
organizational action. Historical work enables us to “bring society back in” and so provide a 
richer content in which to seek understanding of organizational life. 
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Table 1: revised properties of institutions 
Institution Relation Substance Organization Practice 
     
Family Reproduction  Love Household Marriage 
Economy Production Gain Corporation Transaction 
Medicine Embodied 
existence 
Health Hospital Consultation 
Religion Existence Faith Church Prayer 
Play Existence Fun Gallery Game 
Knowledge Natural and 
social world 
Curiosity University Experiment 
Politics Intergroup 
relations 
General interest State Voting 
Military Intergroup 
relations 








1 I use knowledge here in the sense of systematic enquiry, recognizing that forms of applied 
vocational knowledge are a central part of other institutions such as medicine or the law. The 
category of knowledge refers to the product of a distinctive logic of inquiry that is partially 
captured in labels such as “philosophy” or, more recently, “science”. The latter terms are not 
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used here as they have powerful connotations, such as detached, introspective contemplation 
in the case of philosophy or the methods and approach of natural science in the case of 
science. These connotations are reduced by adopting the more abstract category of 
“knowledge” which encompasses the associated endeavor of learning. 
 
 
